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Keating: Keating: Why the Bankruptcy Reform Act

Why the Bankruptcy Reform Act Left Labor
Legacy Costs Alone
Daniel Keating

I spent most of my pre-tenure life as a law professor writing about labor
legacy costs in bankruptcy.' In the late 1980's and early 1990's, the intersection of labor legacy costs and bankruptcy was a hot topic for three reasons.
First, the Supreme Court's decision in NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildisco2 allowed
companies in Chapter 11 to reject collective bargaining agreements under the
same standard as any other executory contract. 3 Shortly thereafter, Congress
reversed that decision with the enactment of Bankruptcy Code § 1113. 4 Second, LTV Corporation's Chapter 11 filing and subsequent refusal to pay longpromised health benefits to its thousands of retirees raised public awareness
of the labor/bankruptcy intersection. Congress responded by creating § 1114.
Finally, LTV attempted to dump its under-funded pension plans on the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC) 5 while LTV was still in Chapter
6
11, but the PBGC successfully fought back at the Supreme Court level.
These three events, coupled with a healthy stock market and a booming
economy, diminished the importance of labor legacy costs. However, it did
not remain a low-key topic for very long. The aftermath of 9/11 and its economic impact suddenly brought labor legacy costs into the news once again.
The intersection of labor legacy costs and bankruptcy (or at least the threat of
bankruptcy) has recently become a major national issue in key industries such
as airlines, steel, coal and auto manufacturing. 7 In some of the newest cases,
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2. 465 U.S. 513 (1984).
3. Id. at 531-32.
4. Pub. L. No. 98-353, § 541(a), 98 Stat. 390, 390-91 (1984) (codified as
amended at 11 U.S.C. § 1113 (2000)).
5. See Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation, http://www.pbgc.gov (last visited
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6. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. LTV Corp., 496 U.S. 633, 656 (1990).
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the culprits have been underfunded pensions; 8 in others, retiree medical benefits; 9 and still in others, union labor contracts. 10 The basic story is almost always the same: management says that the company simply cannot afford to
pay these legacy costs and still be competitive in the relevant industry. If the
beneficiaries of those costs refuse to accept voluntary cuts, then management
uses bankruptcy or the threat of bankruptcy as leverage to force concessions
from the unwilling workers or retirees.
In light of their re-emergence in the national consciousness, one might
have thought that labor legacy costs would be a prime subject for inclusion in
the long-debated and finally enacted Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005 (BAPCPA). Instead, despite an obvious window of opportunity, Congress chose to virtually ignore the problem when it
decided to reform the Bankruptcy Code. This paper attempts to explore and
ultimately explain the puzzle of why Congress left untouched the issue of
labor legacy costs in bankruptcy.
This paper proceeds in four parts. Part I describes the world of labor
legacy costs and how they end up intersecting with bankruptcy. Part II discusses what approaches Congress or the courts have already used to address
the labor/bankruptcy intersection. Part III explores what Congress might have
considered in the bankruptcy reform bill if it had been motivated to take a
serious look at labor legacy costs in bankruptcy. Part IV explains possible
theories as to why Congress chose not to reform the labor/bankruptcy intersection and why that decision was frustrating but prudent.

I. DEFINING LABOR LEGACY COSTS
Essentially, there are three main categories of labor legacy costs: collective bargaining agreements, retiree medical benefits, and defined benefit pension plans. These legacy costs tend to be found primarily, although not exclusively, in traditional union industries such as steel, coal, auto manufacturing,
Alford, Miners to Lose Health Coverage, LEXINGTON HERALD-LEADER, Aug. 10,
2004; Marilyn Geewax, Airline Pension Help in Bill, ATLANTA J. & CONST., June 17,
2006; Greg Gordon, NWA Hopeful for PensionAid, MINNEAPOLIS STAR-TRIB., Oct. 7,
2005; Terry Kinney, Paying a Price: AK Steel Imposes Health Care Costs on Retirees, CINCINNATI POST, June 2, 2006, at C7; Pamela MacLean, United Airlines Uses
PBGC to Get Around Bankruptcy Laws, PALM BEACH DAILY Bus. REv., Nov. 9,
2005; William Neikirk, Plan Stokes Bankruptcy, Pension Fears, CHL TRIB., Mar. 23,

2006; M. William Salganik & Allison Connolly, Steel Retirees Who Lost Health
Benefits Get Help, BALTIMORE SUN, May 30, 2006, at 8D.
8. See, e.g., Albert B. Crenshaw, Pension Agency Seeks More Power, WASH.
POST, Sept. 10, 2004, at E03.
9. See, e.g., Kimberly Blanton, Facing a Fund Gap: Lucent Seeking to Shift
Partof Soaring Health Costs to Retiree, BOSTON GLOBE, Oct. 20, 2004.
10. See, e.g., Northwest Flight Attendants Threaten Strike if Contract Voided,
USA TODAY, Jan.
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and airlines. Although each has unique characteristics, they share a common
feature: the deferred maintenance phenomenon. This means that in each case,
the employer makes future compensation promises to its employees that
eventually come due and cost the employer significantly. The benefit to the
employer in making these promises, however, is that it enables the employer
to avoid certain labor-compensation costs in the short run.
The easiest example of the deferred-maintenance phenomenon is retiree
medical benefits. The beauty of retiree medical benefits from the employer's
perspective is that they do not need to be pre-funded. An employer who is
low on cash to fund current wages can conceivably retain some employees at
the margin with the promise of free medical benefits when they retire."
However, the eventual problem of how to fund those benefits when covered
employees start retiring is precisely the deferred maintenance problem.
Retiree medical benefits began as a nice "extra" by which employers
would promise their current workers continued health coverage upon their
retirement. As health-care costs soared in the 1980's, what began as a side
perk for employees soon became a critical element of their overall compensation plan. At the same time, from the employer's side of the fence, the increasing costs of health care began to transform this benefit into the proverbial money pit. Because most employers traditionally paid retiree medical
benefits on a pay-as-you-go basis, there was a bit of a lag time between the
point when health-care costs started skyrocketing and when employers started
feeling the effects. In certain shrinking industries, particularly those in which
the ratio of retirees to current employees grew at alarming rates, employers
quickly concluded that an unacceptable proportion of their overall labor costs
were being spent on people who were not even providing them any current
productivity. 12
While ERISA's disclosure provisions apply to retiree health benefits, its
mandatory vesting and pre-funding requirements do not. 13 Thus, in addition
11. See, e.g., Alford, supra note 7 ("[These mine workers] worked hard, did what
was expected and accepted lower wages for the promise of health care, but look
where that got them."); Sharon Cohen, Miners Live with Broken Promises, ALBANY
TIMEs UNION, Dec. 5, 2004 ("Many miners say they put up with decades of the dangers of coal dust, diesel fumes and falling rock, believing that [lifelong retiree health
benefits] was an ironclad guarantee.").
12. Cf. Justin Fox, Good Riddance to Corp's Pensions: The Real Shame is that
Workers Put Such Faith in UnstableSystem, CHI. SUN TIMEs, Jan. 12, 2006 (noting in

the analogous area of defined-benefit pensions that "[w]hen succeeding generations
are bigger and wealthier than the ones whose retirements they must help fund ... this
isn't much of a problem. But it's no longer the case at GM, and may no longer hold
for the U.S. as a whole a few decades down the road.").
13. 29 U.S.C. § 1002(1) (2000) (designating retiree health plans as "welfare
plans"); id. § 1021 (failing to exempt welfare plans from disclosure requirements); id.
§ 1051(1) (exempting welfare plans from vesting requirements); id. § 1081(a)(1)
(exempting welfare plans from funding requirements).
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2006
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to the fact that employers are not required to pre-fund retiree medical benefits, employers are also not required to vest those benefits in their employees.
A long line of cases in the late 1980's and early 1990's dealt with the concept
of common-law or contractual vesting, in which employees would argue
(sometimes successfully) that their employers had made contractually enforceable promises to them concerning retiree medical benefits. 14 The nature
of these promises, according to the employees, was that the employee would
continue working for the company until retirement in exchange for the company's promise to provide lifetime health benefits to the employee at no additional cost.
Underfunded defined-benefit pension plans are the close conceptual
cousin to retiree medical benefits, and are also a deferred-maintenance issue.
Prior to the enactment of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act
(ERISA), it was easy to see why they were a clear deferred-maintenance phenomenon, since pre-ERISA, employers were subject to a very loose IRS requirement to pre-fund defined-benefit pension plans. ERISA purported to
change all of that with ostensibly much tighter pre-funding standards, but
there have been loopholes in ERISA's pre-funding structure. These loopholes
explain why we
read so often these days that the PBGC is itself on the brink
15
of insolvency.
Indeed, defined-benefit pension plans were once as unregulated as retiree medical benefits. But the Studebaker collapse in the early 1960's signaled the need for increased regulation. Studebaker went out of business after
promising its employees generous defined-benefit pension plans that it had
not adequately pre-funded. 16 The public outcry that followed led to the en-

actment of ERISA, which created both a mandatory pre-funding and vesting
14. See, e.g., Senn v. United Dominion Indus., 951 F.2d 806 (7th Cir. 1992);
Alday v. Container Corp., 906 F.2d 660 (11 th Cir. 1990); Smith v. ABS Indus., 890
F.2d 841 (6th Cir. 1989); Keffer v. H.K. Porter Co., 872 F.2d 60 (4th Cir. 1989);
Musto v. Am. Gen. Corp., 861 F.2d 897 (6th Cir. 1988); Moore v. Metro Life Ins.
Co., 856 F.2d 488 (2d Cir. 1988); Schalk v. Teledyne, Inc., 751 F. Supp. 1261 (W.D.
Mich. 1990), affd, 948 F.2d 1290 (6th Cir. 1991) (unpublished disposition).
15. See Steve Karnowski, Delta Bankruptcy Spells Trouble for Retiree Benefits,
Oct. 1, 2005 ("[The PBGC] already has raised red flags about its

CINCINNATI POST,

own solvency after having thousands of pension plans dumped on it by hundreds of
steelmakers, other airlines and companies across a spectrum of industries."); Mary
Deibel, Bankruptcies Cast New Light on Pension Fund, FORT WAYNE JOURNALGAZETrE, Sept. 26, 2005 (noting that the PBGC went from a record surplus of $7.7
billion in 2001 to a current deficit of $23.3 billion).
16. See Shelley Smith Curtis, Potentialfor Crisis: Pension Benefit Insurance
and the PBGC, 39 FED. INS. & CORP. COUNS. Q. 131, 131 (1989); Rettig v. Pension

Benefit Guar. Corp., 744 F.2d 133, 137 (D.C. Cir. 1984) ("Throughout the deliberations that culminated in the enactment of ERISA, Congress was inundated with tragic
stories of pension plan failures in which thousands of employees saw the destruction
of the small measure of retirement security they had built up through decades of
forced savings and deferred compensation.").
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol71/iss4/7
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requirement for defined-benefit pension plans. 17 ERISA also instituted a new
federal insurance corporation to serve as a safety net for workers when companies failed to comply with their new pre-funding obligations.18
The ERISA response was helpful in avoiding a Studebaker rerun, but it
was far from perfect. First, there was a difficult transition problem that had to
be dealt with. Because many defined-benefit plans were already in existence
at the time ERISA was enacted, Congress decided that it would be unreasonable to require companies to immediately fund any vested pension promises
already earned by workers up to that point. Instead, companies were required
simultaneously to pre-fund any new pension promises that would accrue going forward, and to begin funding previously accrued benefits. In effect,
companies were given a kind of mortgage arrangement to fulfill their funding
promises on already-earned pensions. This meant, however, that if a company
became insolvent before the "mortgage" on its pensions was fully paid, there
could still be significant unfunded pension liability owed by the employer. To
make matters worse, during the 1980s a number of employers created retroactive benefit enhancements to their defined-benefit pension plans. ERISA allowed these retroactive enhancements to be amortized over a new 30-year
period. 19
A second problem with the pre-funding requirements of ERISA is that
the precise amounts due from an employer each year are a function of various
actuarial assumptions that relate both to the liability side and the asset-return
sides of the equation. For example, if you are an employer trying to predict
what your future costs are with respect to pension obligations, you have to
make certain assumptions about how many retirees will be alive in a given
year who will be owed pension payments. Furthermore, as an employer puts
money aside for future pension promises, it needs to make assumptions about
what return on these assets it should expect. The flexibility that ERISA allows companies with respect to these assumptions has varied over time, but a
recurring problem for the PBGC has been pension-underfunding by companies whose annual pre-funding contributions20 were nevertheless consistent
with ERISA-permitted actuarial assumptions.
A third problem with ERISA's pension-protection scheme, at least from
the perspective of certain employees, is the monthly coverage limit provided
by the PBGC's insurance function. ERISA was not designed with the idea
that the PBGC would guarantee each and every defined-benefit pension plan
with no limits. Today's PBGC guarantee, for example, will only cover an
annual pension of up to about $48,000 for those who retire at age 65 or
17. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1051, 1081.

18. Id. § 1302.
19. See 26 U.S.C. § 412(b)(2)(B)(ii) (providing that when a new plan is estab-

lished, past service of employees may be credited and the liability amortized over 30
years).
20. See generally Keating, Pension Insurance, supra note 1.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2006
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older. 21 The remainder of any defined-benefit pension that is promised to
employees becomes just a claim that the retiree has against the employer.
Unfortunately, the employer is often in bankruptcy if the PBGC has taken
over its pension plan. In the recent spate of airline bankruptcies, this hole in
the ERISA safety net has become fairly prominent, in light of the number of
pilots who have defined-benefit pension plans that greatly exceed the PBGC
maximum-coverage limit. What makes matters even worse is that the Federal
Aviation Administration requires pilots to retire at age 60,2 when the PBGC
23
coverage limit for them is only about $30,000 per year.
The third and final category of labor legacy costs, collective bargaining
agreements (CBAs) are perhaps the least obvious example of a deferredmaintenance issue. From the employee's perspective, the chief benefits of
having a CBA are receiving, on average, higher wages and greater job security than non-union employees. Furthermore, the job security that workers are
given in a union contract may enable the employer to save costs with lower
employee turnover. In certain industries, employers with CBAs may also
have the short-term benefit of avoiding some labor-related strife that would
likely come from hiring non-union workers. On the other hand, CBAs also
have a deferred maintenance factor that arises for the employer when the
employer reaches a point in the future where perhaps it would like to lay off
workers in order to cut costs. Being subject to a CBA makes it more costly
for the employer to effect such layoffs at a time when it would otherwise be
cost-efficient for it to do so.
Collective bargaining agreements can sometimes stand on their own, but
more often than not they will include one or both of the other labor legacy
categories within them. For instance, in the United Airlines bankruptcy, at
least one of the collective bargaining agreements at issue included a definedbenefit pension plan as a part of it. Indeed, it would not be uncommon to find
a union contract that includes both defined-benefit pension promises as well
as retiree medical benefits. The practical import of these multiple-category
cases for an employer looking to shed legacy labor costs is that it will now
have multiple hurdles to overcome, including both § 1113 and § 1114 of the
Bankruptcy Code, plus the employee protections provided in ERISA.

II. How BANKRUPTCY HAS ALREADY ADDRESSED LABOR LEGACY
COSTS
Over the years, Congress and various courts have addressed labor legacy
costs with a wide variety of approaches. Although the new bankruptcy
amendments did not add a great deal to these approaches, it would be a mistake to say they did nothing to address any of the three categories of labor
21. 29 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(3).
22. 14 C.F.R. § 121.383 (2006).
23. See Kamowski, supra note 15.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol71/iss4/7
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legacy costs. While arguably doing nothing for collective bargaining agreements and defined benefit pension plans, Congress did include a minor
amendment to § 1114. The new § 1114(1) provides that if the debtoremployer effects a pre-bankruptcy modification of retiree medical benefits at
a time when the debtor was insolvent, the bankruptcy court shall reinstate the
retiree benefits at their pre-modification level "unless the court finds that the
balance of the equities clearly favors such modification." 24
Presumably, this new provision was inserted in anticipation of a contingency in which a corporate employer contemplating bankruptcy modifies
retiree benefits on the eve of bankruptcy to avoid the special protections
given to those benefits after the employer files Chapter 11. Although this
provision is rather minor, it deserves mention here.
At least one commentator has argued that this new provision in § 1114
indirectly settles another issue on which courts have been split: whether or
not § 1114 removes an employer's non-bankruptcy right to terminate retiree
medical benefits that by their terms can be modified by the employer at any
time for no cause. 25 This argument focuses on the fact that Congress has required that any retiree medical benefits modified during this pre-petition window must be reinstated in the employer's Chapter 11.26 Therefore, once an
employer is in Chapter 11, the same would hold true for retiree benefits that
the employer had not yet even terminated by the time it filed for bankruptcy.
Aside from these new amendments, Congress and the Supreme Court
had three key responses to the three categories of labor legacy costs in bankof § 1113; the enactment of § 1114; and the Supreme
ruptcy: the enactment 28
LTV.
in
decision
Court
Prior to the enactment of § 1113, courts viewed a CBA as just another
executory contract. 29 As such, a collective bargaining agreement could be
rejected by a Chapter 11 debtor-employer pursuant to the usual "business
judgment" test that courts had formulated for the debtor-in-possession's assumption-rejection decision under § 365 of the Bankruptcy Code. Not surprisingly, labor groups found this standard much too lenient, and feared that
any company encumbered by a burdensome union labor contract could purge
itself of that contract simply by going through the Chapter 11 process.
24. 11 U.S.C. § 1114(1) (Supp. V 2005).
25. Richard Levin & Alesia Ranney-Marinelli, The Creeping Repeal of Chapter
11: The Significant Business Provisions of the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and
Consumer ProtectionAct of 2005, 79 AM. BANKR. L.J. 603, 610-11 (2005).
26. Id. at 610. This reinstatement is required regardless of whether the benefits
are terminable at will by the employer.
27. Id. at 610-11.
28. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. LTV Corp., 496 U.S. 633 (1990).
29. NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildisco, 465 U.S. 513 (1984) (holding that "a collecfive-bargaining agreement is an executory contract subject to rejection by a debtor-inpossession").
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2006
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Congress ultimately agreed, and enacted § 1113 of the Bankruptcy Code
as a response to Bildisco later in that same year. Section 1113 is a fairly
wordy section, but essentially provides that an employer in Chapter 11 can no
longer unilaterally reject a collective bargaining agreement simply because
rejecting that agreement would be a sound business decision for the employer.3 ° Instead, an employer in Chapter 11 must make a proposal to the
union including only those modifications to the collective bargaining agreement necessary for the employer to effect a successful reorganization.31 Only
after such a proposal is made and unreasonably rejected by the union may
the
32
Chapter 11 debtor-employer reject the collective bargaining agreement.
Section 1113 was, on balance, a victory for organized labor, but it
probably has not been the panacea that unions first thought it might be. For
one thing, if an employer's fortunes are such that it finds itself in Chapter 11
bankruptcy, the employer likely needs a reduction in labor costs as a necessary ingredient to a successful reorganization. Second, § 1113 creates a standard that is fraught with uncertainties. The primary uncertainty is when is a
particular modification "necessary" to allow a successful reorganization? 33 In
some ways, the "necessary" standard of § 1113 conflates the issue of asset
deployment in bankruptcy with that of asset distribution.
Take, for example, the case of a Chapter 11 debtor-employer whose union workers are currently earning $20 per hour in an industry where the workers' non-union counterparts are making $12 for essentially the same work.
Suppose that the employer can easily show that at a continuing wage rate of
$20 per hour, the business would have to liquidate because its costs would
continue to exceed its revenues. The employer can also show that at a wage
rate of $15 an hour, the business would make a slight profit and thus would
have a slight going-concern value to share with its many other creditors. Finally, the employer can show that, if allowed to by the court, it could hire
non-union workers at $12 an hour and make a fairly healthy profit, creating a
much-larger going-concern value to distribute to its creditors. The question
unanswered by § 1113 is the relative priority of bankruptcy creditors and
union workers. Can the employer demand a modification of union wages to
$12 per hour, which increases its return to its creditors in bankruptcy at the
expense of its union workers' future wages, or can it only demand a modifica-

30. 11 U.S.C. § 1113 (2000).
31. Id.
32. Id. Whether a proposal is unreasonably rejected will be determined by the
judge in each case.
33. See MacLean, supra note 7 (noting the split in the federal circuits on this
question, whereas the Third Circuit requires that any modifications to a collective
bargaining agreement must be essential to avoid a short-term liquidation of the debtor,
the Second Circuit requires that the debtor-employer simply show that the proposed
modifications are necessary to improve the company's chances of a long-term reorganization).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol71/iss4/7
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tion of union wages to $15 an hour, which benefits its union workers at the
expense of its other creditors?
Another way to describe the chief unanswered question of § 1113 is
that, although Congress gave union workers a stronger position than they had
prior to the enactment of § 1113, it is unclear just how strong a position Congress intended to give workers vis-a-vis the many other claimants in the employer's bankruptcy. This issue of relative priority is not answered by §
1113.34
Four years after the enactment of § 1113, Congress's response to the issue of retiree medical benefits in bankruptcy in § 1114 is essentially a carbon
copy of the language in § 1113. 35 The only problem, however, is that subjects
covered by these two Code sections represent fundamentally different paradigms. Collective bargaining agreements are a form of executory contract,
because there are significant contractual performances remaining on both
sides. By contrast, retiree medical benefits are nothing more than just a claim,
because the retirees have already given their former employer all they can. As
a result, the "necessary to permit the reorganization of the debtor" standard
for modifications shared by both § 1113 and § 1114 is even more odd in the
context of retiree medical benefits than it is in the context of collective bargaining agreements. After all, retiree medical benefits are simply a claim
against the employer that used to be, prior to § 1114, a general unsecured prepetition claim. This is probably why the LTV Corporation stopped paying
such claims once it filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy in 1986.36 If Congress
wanted to elevate retiree benefit claims relative to other claims in bankruptcy,
then it should have assigned a clear, specific, relative priority to ensure that
these benefits were paid before other creditors.
Instead, Congress created a strong-sounding, but ultimately nebulous
edict in § 1114 that allows employers to quit paying retiree medical benefits
if it is "necessary" to permit the employer's reorganization. Incidentally, on
the question of relative priorities with other claimants, both § 1113 and §
1114 include the noble-sounding but rather empty directive that any modifithe debtor and
cations allowed by the judge should "assure[] that all creditors,
37
all of the affected parties are treated fairly and equitably.,

34. Yet another question that Congress left unanswered in § 1113 is whether a
court-approved rejection of a collective bargaining agreement gives rise to a damages
claim in bankruptcy for the affected union workers. Some argue that the damages
claim created more generally in § 365 for rejected executory contracts should inure to
the benefit of workers in the § 1113 context; others argue that when Congress created
§ 1113, it did so for the express purpose of taking collective bargaining agreements
completely outside the purview of § 365 and thus the union should not be able to
"cherry-pick" only the favorable parts from § 365.
35. 11 U.S.C. § 1114 (2000 & Supp. V 2005); 11 U.S.C. § 1113 (2000).
36. See Keating, Good Intentions, supra note 1, at 162.
37. 11 U.S.C. §§ 1113(b)(1)(A), 1114(f)(1)(A) (2000).
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2006
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Some of the first courts to interpret § 1114 struggled with the question
of whether these new retiree rights would trump, as a relative matter, the
rights of perfected secured creditors. Citing, among other things, constitutional concerns about depriving previously perfected secured creditors their
property rights without due process, these early courts interpreting § 1114
ultimately concluded that Congress could not have 3intended
for the special
8
position of retiree medical benefits to extend that far.
One of those courts even received a statement from Senator Howard
Metzenbaum, the sponsoring senator of the retiree legislation, urging that the
retirees continue to be paid consistent with the "intent of Congress." When it
ultimately rejected Senator Metzenbaum's plea, the exasperated court could
not help noting that "short of printing money, there is no way to see that all
39
claims are paid in full."
For Congress, the beauty of both the § 1113 and § 1114 responses to labor legacy costs is that neither one required spending any money. These were
classic cheap-and-dirty political responses to difficult and complex economic
problems. Congress did nothing to make the bankruptcy pie any larger; the
size of the pieces among various claimants was simply being reallocated.
Union workers and retirees were clearly going to get larger pieces than before, but Congress did not address or acknowledge the burdens it was placing
on various creditors and workers with an interest in a bankrupt corporation.
The third category of labor legacy costs in bankruptcy, underfunded defined-benefit pension plans, was not specifically addressed by Congress. For
its part, Congress thought that it had already dealt with that mess by enacting
ERISA, a set of regulations that applied to employers whether or not they
were in bankruptcy. But, as noted above, ERISA had several limitations that
would not allow the problem of underfunded pension plans to disappear
overnight. When LTV Steel filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy in 1986, it was
destined to become the poster child for underfunded pension plans in the
post-ERISA era.
At the time LTV filed for bankruptcy, its three pension plans were underfunded by a total of more than $2 billion.4 ° By 1987, PBGC decided it was
going to involuntarily terminate LTV's pension plans because LTV was not
making the required minimum-funding contributions and PBGC feared that
its own liability as insurer would increase if the plans were allowed to continue. At this point, LTV figured out a way to use the combination of ERISA
and Chapter 11 bankruptcy as a new corporate welfare program. The plan
would work like this: file Chapter 11 when your pension plans are underfunded, then terminate the plans so that the PBGC will take over liability for
38. United Steel Workers of Am. v. Jones & Lamson Machine Co. (In re Jones
& Lamson Machine Co.), 102 B.R. 12, 15-17 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1989) (interpreting
the stop-gap precursor to § 1114); In re GF Corp., 115 B.R. 579 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio
1990), vacated in part, 120 B.R. 421 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1990).
39. In re GF Corp., 115 B.R. at 585.
40. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. LTV Corp., 496 U.S. 633, 640 (1990).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol71/iss4/7
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the plans. Although the PBGC will have a massive reimbursement claim, that
is a claim that you can pay in bankruptcy dollars rather than in real 100%
dollars. Your employees won't be happy since the PBGC's coverage of their
pensions is limited, but those shortfalls can be dealt with through follow-on
plans. A follow-on plan is the pension equivalent to Medi-Gap coverage: it
fills the gaps in the pension coverage that are left by the PBGC insurance
limits.
So, at the end of the day, an employer can keep its employees happy
about their pension coverage at a fraction of the cost it would pay if it did not
get the PBGC insurance subsidy to handle the lion's share of the expense.
Then the employer emerges from Chapter 11 as a reorganized company, free
of the massive pension underfunding that put it into bankruptcy in the first
place. To no one's surprise, the PBGC found this arrangement unacceptable,
and the Supreme Court ultimately agreed with the PBGC. The tool that the
PBGC used to fight back was its restoration powers: its ability to force a
company to restore a terminated pension plan and thereby require the employer to resume the funding obligations for that plan. The Supreme Court's
1990 decision in Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporationv. LTV Corp.41 rec-

ognized the PBGC's broad discretion in restoring terminated pension plans of
companies in Chapter 11.42 Thanks to this decision, the PBGC has since enjoyed important negotiating leverage in dealing with employers with significantly underfunded pension plans in Chapter 11 proceedings.
Armed with this broad power to restore terminated pension plans, the
PBGC has not felt the need to push for any bankruptcy-specific pension legislation since the Supreme Court's decision in LTV. But the PBGC's job is not
easy when it deals with yet another Chapter 11 employer with substantially
underfunded pensions. PBGC's dilemma is similar to the dilemma that Congress faces in deciding whether to enact tougher pension funding rules generally. On the one hand, it wants to create requirements or incentives for companies to fund their defined-benefit pension plans as quickly and generously
as possible. On the other hand, if it sets up requirements that are too stringent,
it risks forcing some of those employers out of business altogether. When that
happens, the PBGC will be left with yet another pension plan that it has taken
over, with probably a very low return on its reimbursement claim against the
employer-sponsor that is now out of business. Both the PBGC and Congress
must constantly struggle with devising the optimal formula that maximizes
pension pre-funding by employers without putting the affected employers out
of business altogether.43
41. Id.
42. Id. at 645-51.

43. For a classic example of this tension playing itself out today in Congress, see
Gordon, supra note 7. That story describes how, while on one hand Congress is trying
to pass a pension protection bill that would significantly increase premiums that employers would have to pay for the PBGC insurance of their defined-benefit plans, on
the other hand Congress is debating whether to insert into that bill a special provision
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2006
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Il. CONGRESSIONAL OPTIONS FOR DEALING WITH LABOR LEGACY
COSTS IN THE NEW BANKRUPTCY BILL?
As previously mentioned, it is somewhat puzzling that Congress did virtually nothing to address labor legacy costs when it amended the Bankruptcy
Code. Its inaction, however, does not mean that Congress lacked available
options. With regard to CBAs in bankruptcy, Congress might have done one
of two things. First, Congress could have clarified the relative priority of union workers' claims to wages and collective bargaining agreement benefits in
Chapter 11. Granted, the CBA is not a pure claim, but rather a mixed claim
and asset for the Chapter 11 employer. The "asset" part for the debtor-inpossession in this executory contract is the right to require the workers to
continue working as a precondition to receiving their promised salary and
benefits. Assuming that the workers are willing to keep working, however,
what exactly is the status of their claim to keep receiving the same level of
wages and benefits that is contained in the collective bargaining agreement?
Congress might have said that this claim on the workers' part should be
paid ahead of every claimant except previously perfected secured creditors (to
avoid constitutional problems), or alternatively, ahead of all unsecured creditors except administrative expense claimants. Thus, when a court is asked to
modify the collective bargaining agreement, it would only do so to the extent
necessary to enable secured creditors to get paid in full (my first example) or
administrative expense claimants and those above to get paid in full (my second example).
The second and more extreme step that Congress might have taken with
respect to collective bargaining agreements is simply to say that the debtorin-possession no longer has the option to reject or modify collective bargaining agreements in bankruptcy. Note that this approach would not mean that
collective bargaining agreements would never be modified in Chapter 11.
Rather, it would mean that the union would retain the discretion to decide
when a modification of the union labor contract was necessary to avoid a
liquidation of the company, rather than leaving the court to decide when such
modifications are necessary.
Yet a third reform that Congress might have enacted with collective
bargaining agreements is putting a provision in § 507 of the Bankruptcy Code
that defines the relative priority of union workers' claims for future wages in
a case where their employer liquidates. 44 Section 1113 does not deal with that

that would give both Northwest and Delta Airlines 14 years to pay off their multibillion dollar defined-benefit pension deficits. Id.
44. And if Congress had bothered in the bankruptcy reform bill to deal with
claims in § 1113, it might also have settled the issue of whether a court-sanctioned
rejection of a collective bargaining agreement gives rise to a claim for damages for
the affected union workers. See Keating, Pension Insurance, supra note 1.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol71/iss4/7
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issue, since it is part of Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code and thus does not
apply in a Chapter 7 liquidation.
There is already a Bankruptcy Code provision, § 1113(f), that purports
to prohibit a company in Chapter 11 from unilaterally terminating or altering
the provisions of a collective bargaining agreement. 45 What § 1113(f) does
not address, however, is the priority status of the employees' claims for past
and future wages when a Chapter 11 employer fails to comply with the terms
of a collective bargaining agreement, and ends up going out of business and
liquidating. To its credit, the comparable provision for retiree medical benefits, § 11 14(e)(2), at least says that any claims for retiree medical benefits that
confirmation will take on the status of an
are not paid by the time of plan
46
administrative expense priority.
The reforms that Congress might have effected regarding § 1114 are
similar to the ones suggested above for § 1113. First, Congress could have
clarified the relative priority status of the retiree medical benefit claim. Although it could be argued that Congress has already done that with §
11 14(e)(2), that section does not seem to address the case where an employer
ends up liquidating and never even makes it to confirmation. Thus, if Congress really wanted to be clear about the status of the retiree benefit claim in
all cases, it could have added a priority for such claims to § 507 that would
apply in Chapter 7 liquidations as well as in Chapter 11 reorganization cases.
Second, just like with § 1113, Congress could have created an unqualified prohibition that prevented any modifications of retiree benefits in a
Chapter 11 case. This would not mean that retiree benefits would never get
modified in a Chapter 11 bankruptcy. Rather, it would shift the discretion to
the retirees themselves to decide what modifications in their benefits are truly
necessary in order to allow for reorganization. This would not give retirees
unfettered discretion, however. The built-in check would be the retirees'
knowledge that an unreasonable refusal to modify their benefits could lead to
the liquidation of the company; creating a scenario where there would be no
future source of funding for their continued benefits.
With respect to underfunded pension plans, the same basic pattern of
choices was potentially available to Congress: new claim priorities, or outright prohibition of plan terminations. What would complicate reform efforts
with underfunded pension plans is the existence of an important third party,
the PBGC. For example, the notion of a new priority for pension-related
claims in bankruptcy begs the question: whose claim? If the plan had not yet
been terminated by the PBGC, then the claims against the debtor-employer
for any underfunding would be owed to the plan itself. If the plan has been
terminated before the employer's bankruptcy filing or is terminated during
the pendency of a Chapter 11, then the PBGC would become the holder of a
large claim against the employer.
45. 11 U.S.C. § 1113(f) (2000).

46. Id. § 1114(e)(2).
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2006

13

Missouri Law Review, Vol. 71, Iss. 4 [2006], Art. 7
MISSOURI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 71

The possibility of a Congressional prohibition against pension plan terminations would also be complicated by the PBGC's role in the pension
process. The PBGC currently has the ability to use its involuntary termination
powers against a Chapter 11 employer, with the goal of maximizing recoveries from that employer and minimizing losses to the PBGC.47 Conversely, as
discussed above, 48 there are times in which the PBGC would wish to "unterminate" or restore a plan that has been terminated. If Congress were to
create a blanket rule against pension plan terminations in bankruptcy, the
PBGC would lose the flexibility it currently has to use either its termination
or restoration powers for maximum recoveries against a Chapter 11 employer.
IV. WHY CONGRESS DID (VIRTUALLY) NOTHING WITH LABOR
LEGACY COSTS
There are three reasons why Congress did not reform the labor legacy
cost/bankruptcy intersection. First, the political motivation to enact this bankruptcy reform came primarily from the credit industry. The credit-industry
achieved its main goal in the reform process of adding means-testing to consumer bankruptcy. Making sure that retirees and union employees got a better
deal in the corporate bankruptcy of their employer was not, it seems fair to
say, at the top of these lobbyists' wish list. Indeed, the potential reforms that
might have addressed labor legacy costs could have included various priorities for labor legacy creditors that might have reduced the overall return for
the creditors who were the primary movers behind the push for means-testing.
The second reason is that Congress has already taken bankruptcy laws
about as far as they can go to help solve the labor legacy cost problem. While
Congress could certainly create new "super-priorities," as Congress is wont to
do, this would be less than a complete solution. Even Congress cannot upset
the existing property interests of previously perfected secured creditors, so
super-priorities would be ineffective in a large percentage
of the cases where
49
no one but the secured creditors are getting paid in full.
The other problem with newly created priorities is that they make it
more difficult for the debtor-in-possession to realize whatever going-concern
value that there is in the company. A recent case-in-point is the Chapter 11
bankruptcy of the Horizon Natural Resources Company, an Illinois-based

47. See Keating, Pension Insurance,supra note 1, at 71.
48. See supra text accompanying notes 41-42.
49. Any secured creditors who became perfected following the enactment of
such a law should not be protected, since they would have had notice of their subordinate position at the time they created their security interest. The constitutional problems would only exist with respect to secured creditors whose liens were already
perfected at the time such a new law took effect.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol71/iss4/7
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coal corporation. In that case, massive retiree medical benefit claims had to
be dealt with if the company were to be sold as an entire reorganized unit.
The retiree claims, however, were so daunting that no buyers wanted to touch
the company. 51 Finally, the bankruptcy court allowed the company to sell
certain of its mines free and clear of the retiree benefit claims.52 As horrible
as this was for the retirees involved, that sale at least allowed some of the
53
company's current workers to retain their jobs, albeit at reduced wage rates.
For similar reasons, prohibiting the termination of retiree benefits or collective bargaining agreements might put all parties in a worse position than
what we have under the current Bankruptcy Code. With the current Code, a
bankruptcy judge makes the decision as to whether a proposed modification
to retiree benefits or a collective bargaining agreement is in fact necessary to
the employer's reorganization. Transferring that right to the retirees or the
union risks creating a very unhealthy bargaining dynamic in which the employer and the retirees/union would often engage in the negotiation equivalent
of "chicken." The employer would claim that if the employees would not
agree to a certain modification, the company would have to liquidate. The
employees would claim that the employer was bluffing and would insist that
no such modifications were necessary in order to reorganize, and that the
savings could come in other areas. At least in the current model, both parties
know that an objective third party, the bankruptcy judge, will ultimately pass
on the reasonableness of their side of the story. The alternative model seems
like it might be a recipe for too much brinksmanship and not enough serious
negotiation.
The final reason that I suggested as to why Congress did not adopt any
significant bankruptcy reforms in the area of labor legacy costs is that labor
legacy costs are not really a bankruptcy problem. To much of the world, these
often seem like a bankruptcy problems, 54 but that's only because these problems, despite being created well before bankruptcy, are now playing themselves out on a bankruptcy stage. Bankruptcy is often the final act in the play
for these companies, but the key plot developments occurred much earlier on.
The Horizon case cited above is an example of this. 55 After that decision, I received calls from a number of reporters who were asking me how
our bankruptcy laws could allow such a horrible result for retirees. While
conceding that this was indeed a horrible result for retirees, I was quick to
point out that the seeds for the horrible result were sown long before Hori50. In re Horizon Natural Res. Co., 316 B.R. 268 (Bankr. E.D. Ky. 2004).
51. See Alford, supra note 7; Cohen, supra note 11.
52. In re Horizon, 316 B.R. at 271, 283.
53. Id. at 283.
54. See, e.g., Alford, supra note 7 (quoting United Mine Workers Association
president Cecil Roberts as saying, "It is past time for working people to start fighting
back and joining together to reform the nation's extremely biased bankruptcy and
labor laws.").
55. See supra text accompanying notes 50-53.
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zon's bankruptcy was even anticipated. This situation was facilitated by a
system that allowed this company to make grandiose promises to its workers
about the health benefits that they would receive as retirees without requiring
the company to put aside in advance the money necessary to cover these
promises.
By the time a company is in bankruptcy, there are not usually any good
choices; just a series of bad choices from which to choose the least-worst. A
recent example of this unfortunate phenomenon was the United Airlines case
and its default on its pension obligations to its workers. At the bankruptcy
court hearing to decide whether United could terminate its defined-benefit
pension plans, the attorney for the union flight attendants argued against the
termination by declaring that "[w]ithout equity, there is no justice."56 On the
other side was the testimony of United's Chief Financial Office, Jake Brace,
who argued that the airline had no choice but to seek these terminations. "All
the work we have done and continue to do is about ensuring a healthy United
work enables competifor all employees and our customers," he said. 57 "That
58
company."
our
for
future
successful
a
and
jobs
tive
Returning again to the Horizon case, the choice facing the bankruptcy
judge was essentially to: 1) let the company liquidate, in which case the retirees would get nothing, and all of the workers would lose their jobs, or 2) to
allow this sale of assets free and clear of retiree claims, which would save
some jobs but would also leave the retirees with nothing.
The true fix to virtually all of these labor legacy costs is a serious prefunding requirement, which of course has nothing at all to do with bankruptcy
law. One of the biggest hurdles to getting there is the transition period. This is
not the sort of problem that can be solved instantaneously, as Congress saw
when it enacted ERISA; three decades later, we are still dealing with some of
the underfunding problems that existed back then. Indeed, during the late
1980s and early 1990s, Congress substantially tightened some of ERISA's
pre-funding loopholes, 59 but the transition problems have persisted to this
day.
While Congress may have done everything realistically possible with
tightening the pre-funding requirements of ERISA, there is currently a bill
pending in Congress that would significantly raise an employer's PBGC in56. George Raine, U.S. Judge Lets United Default on Pensions, SAN FRANCISCO
CHRON., May 11, 2005, at Al.

57. Id.
58. Id. A similar situation occurred with Delta Airlines, which also sought to
terminate its pension plans. In trying to explain that decision to a group of angry Delta
retirees, Chief Executive Gerald Grinstein told them, "It's a choice between what we
propose and no company at all. We have no ability to borrow additional money. What
we have is what we have." Russell Grantham, Delta's Grinstein Faces Retiree
Groups, ATLANTA J. & CONST., Oct. 29, 2005, at G1.

59. See PETER WIEDENBECK & RUSSELL OSGOOD, CASES AND MATERIALS ON
EMPLOYEE BENEFITS 402-11, 431-34 (1996).
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surance premiums as a way to try to shore up the financial position of the
PBGC.60 If that bill is enacted, then the cost of defined-benefit pension plans
for employers will grow even more.
Regardless of whether the new federal legislation on pension insurance
premiums becomes law, the accounting profession may prove to be the real
instrument for change in this area. In December 2003, the Financial Accounting Standards Board substantially revised some of its statements in order to
require greater employer disclosure about pensions and other post-retirement
benefits. In short, the Financial Accounting Standards Board has made clear
its intention to force companies to start transparently indicating these costs on
their balance sheets, particularly with respect to commitments that are being
6
made now that will not come due until the future. 1
Ironically, the upshot of all these reform efforts is that fewer and fewer
employers are choosing to offer these benefits at all.62 The percentage of
companies that are using defined-benefit pension plans continues to shrink
each year.63 With respect to retiree medical benefits, companies that have
such programs are cutting them back in various ways, and very few companies are choosing to start new programs where none now exist. Generous
collective bargaining agreements for union workers are also becoming things
of the past as increased global competition makes such contracts untenable
for American employers who are struggling to retain their market share in a
world economy with many new low-cost players.
All of which leads to the question: "will workers and retirees be better
off where unfunded promises of future benefits have been replaced with no
promised future benefits at all?" To the extent that employers account for
their employees' future needs at all, the trend seems to be towards giving
employees some money now to invest as they would wish for future needs,
such as with various forms of defined-contribution pension plans. This approach shifts the investment-return risk from the employer to the employee;
an arrangement that poses its own set of problems, as we saw in the Enron
case. In Enron, employees had defined-contribution plans, but man of the
employees included almost exclusively Enron stock in their accounts.
60. See David Nicklaus, If You Have a Penchantfor a Pension, You May Be Out
of Luck, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Jan. 22, 2006, at El; Gordon, supra note 7.
61. See Adam Geller, New Accounting Rules Could Retire Pensions, ST. LOUIS
POST-DISPATCH, Jan. 17, 2006, at B 1.

62. See Fox, supra note 12 (noting that IBM, Verizon, NCR, Lockheed Martin,
Motorola and many other financially healthy companies have begun the process of
opting out of the defined-benefit pension arena by freezing current benefits and moving to defined-contribution pension models).
63. See Nicklaus, supra note 60 (indicating that at companies with more than
100 employees, the percentage of companies using defined-benefit plans has shrunk
from 84 percent to 36 percent between 1980 and 2000).
64. See John Boehner, Boehner Op-Ed in the Houston Chronicle on Pension
Reform/Investment Advice, Hous. CHRoN., Aug. 18, 2006; see also Milton Ezrati,
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As the Enron case shows, even with a shift away from unfunded future
promises, workers and retirees can still get hurt in the bankruptcy of their
employer. Under this scenario, however, the hurt is more likely to come from
the loss of the employee's job itself than from the failure of the employer to
make good on some future promise. In the new world economy, the promises
most likely won't be made in the first place. And in the transition period to
come, workers should expect to begin shouldering a greater and greater share
of the responsibility to prepare for their own financial futures. In conceding
this reality, one financial columnist pondered, "Are individual workers any
That's debatable, but many of them are
better equipped to handle those risks?
65
being told they have no choice."
The future will not likely bring a perfect system, but the system will be
better than that which exists now. It all comes down to fulfilling workers'
reasonable expectations. The problem with the old system is that workers and
retirees were led to believe one thing about the security of their health and
pension benefits, and only later did they learn the ugly truth about what it
means to have underfunded benefits and an insolvent employer. In the new
world to come, employees may make bad choices about investing their defined-contribution pension funds, but at least they will see the consequences
of those choices play out on a year-by-year basis rather than getting the bad
news all of a sudden. And at least it will be their own bad choices rather than
their employer's.
Furthermore, in a world with defined-contribution plans, the bankruptcy
of an employer should not have the catastrophic impact that it does in the case
of an employer with defined-benefit plans. Although Enron may have demonstrated otherwise, it was simply a painful lesson about the need to diversify
one's portfolio, whether it is an individual retirement fund or some other investment vehicle.
As for the decline of retiree medical benefits, that strikes me as a larger
problem for our country that is beyond the scope of bankruptcy and perhaps
beyond the scope of labor and employment law. Even there, however, workers are better off in a world where they are not falsely led to believe that a
lifetime guarantee of health benefits will be there for them. Retirements may
be delayed as a result, but at least workers will have the option of reasonable
planning with full disclosure about where they stand. Such a system may
seem harsh, but it is far preferable to a system that is inherently deceptive.

Pension Law Encourages New Trend in Savings, NEWARK N.J. STAR-LEDGER, Sept.
1, 2006, at 25.
65. Nicklaus, supra note 60.
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